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The Right to Life of the Unborn-An
Assessment of the Eighth Amendment to the
Irish Constitution
The late President of Ireland and former Chief Justice of
the Irish Supreme Court, Cearbhall O'Dalaigh, once stated,
"Constitutional rights are declared not alone because of bitter
memories of the past but no less because of the improbable, but
not-to-be-overlooked, perils of the future."' This statement describes the rationale behind the eighth amendment to the Irish
Constitution. Viewed in popular terms as a prolife amendment,
its genesis lies in fear that the almost universal trend to liberalize abortion legislation may creep into Ireland. The amendment attempts to strike the appropriate balance between the
mother's constitutionally protected personal rights and the unborn's right to life. Although it was strongly supported by the
people, the amendment contains some technical problems, as
well as some broad language that may permit rather than prevent the introduction of abortion legislation in Ireland. However, in light of the strong public opinion against any liberalization of abortion laws, and the legislative and judicial
development of Irish family law, the more realistic view is that
the amendment is a powerful endorsement of Ireland's prolife
position.

In order to understand the legal and political atmosphere in
Ireland a t the time the amendment was passed, it is necessary to
understand (1) the historical development of the Irish Republic,
(2) the effects of foreign legislation on Irish law, and (3) the development of Irish abortion law.
Because English rule was imposed for several centuries, English common law directly applied -in Ireland.2 Abortion was
viewed by early English commentators as a serious crime. Blackstone stated:
1. McMahon v. Attorney Gen., 1972 Ir. R. 69, 111.
2. Henchy, Precedent in the Irish Supreme Court, 25 MOD.L. Rev. 544 (1962).
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Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in
every individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon
as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb. For if a woman is quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise, killeth it
in her womb; or if anyone beat her, whereby the child dieth in
her body, and she is delivered of a dead child; this, though not
murder, was by the ancient law homicide or manslaughter. But
the modern law doth not look upon this offence in quite so
atrocious a light, but merely as a heinous mi~demeanor.~

Ireland was incorporated into the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland in 1800 by the Union with Ireland Act.4 The
English Parliament became the sole legislator for both England
and Ireland and thereafter all enactments specifically stated
whether they were to apply to England, Ireland, or both.6
In the nineteenth century, the English Parliament codified
the law governing abortion in the Offences Against the Person
The Act specifically declared that it applied to Ireland.7
Sections 58 and 59 provided:
58.

Every Woman, being with Child, who with Intent to procure her own Miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to
herself any Poison or other noxious Thing, or shall unlawfully use any Instrument or other Means whatsoever with
the like Intent, and whosoever, with Intent to procure the
Miscarriage of any Woman, whether she be or be not with
Child, shall unlawfully administer to her or cause to be
taken by her any Poison or other noxious Thing, or shall
unlawfully use any Instrument or other Means whatsoever with the like Intent, shall be guilty of Felony, and
being convicted thereof shall be liable, a t the Discretion
of the Court, to be kept in Penal Servitude for Life or for
any Term not less than Three Years, or to be imprisoned

3. 1 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES
129-30 (4th ed. 1771); see also E. COKE,THIRD
INSTITUTE
50 (1979) (1st ed. London 1628).
4. 39 & 40 Geo. 3, ch. 67 (1800), reprinted in 23 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES
OF ENGLAND
832 (A. Yonge 3d ed. 1970). The union was codified by an identical Irish act, the Act of
Union (Ireland) 1800. The Act abolished the separate Irish Parliament that had existed
since the thirteenth century. The Act received the Royal Assent on August 1, 1800.
5. For example, The Abortion Act, 1967, ch. 87, 5 7(3) specifically provides that it
does not apply to Northern Ireland.
6. 24 & 25 Vict., ch. 100 (1861).
7. Id. The preamble to the Act states, "Whereas it is expedient to consolidate and
amend the Statute Law of England and Ireland in relation to offences against the person
." (emphasis in original).
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for any Term not exceeding Two Years, with or without
Hard Labour, and with or without Solitary Confinement.
Whosoever shall unlawfully supply or procure any Poison
or other noxious Thing, or any Instrument or Thing
whatsoever, knowing that the same is intended to be unlawfully used or employed with Intent to procure the
Miscarriage of any Woman, whether she be or be not with
Child, shall be guilty of a Misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, a t the Discretion of the
Court, to be kept in Penal Servitude for the Term of
Three Years, or to be imprisoned for any Term not exceeding Two Years, with or without Hard Labour.

This Act continues to be the law concerning abortion in Ireland
today.8
In 1921 a treaty was signed between Ireland and England
forming the Irish Free State (Saorstat Eireann) out of twentysix of the thirty-two Irish counties.' Although it remained a
member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Irish Free
State ceased to be part of the United Kingdom. In 1922 an Irish
Constitution was established.1•‹ This constitution was amended
twenty-seven times in the next fifteen years" and was finally
superceded in 1937 when the present constitution was approved
by plebiscite. The eighth amendment discussed in this comment
has been incoporated into the 1937 con~titution.'~
The 1937 constitution virtually severed Ireland's ties to
Great Britain.13 However, it provided (as did the 1922 constitution) that all laws previously in force would continue to be of
full force and effect so long as they were consistent with the
1937 constitution, or until they were repealed or amended by the
Oireachtas (Irish Parliament).14 Thus, the "unlawful miscar8. Binchy, Abortion and the Law, in ABORTION
NOW69 (1983) (published by Life
Education and Research Network).
9. Codified in The Irish Free State (Agreement) Act, 1922, 12 & 13 Geo. 5, ch. 4,
OF ENGLAND
636 (A. Yonge 3d ed. 1968). The reSTATUTES
reprinted in 4 HALSBURY'S
maining six counties now constitute Northern Ireland and remain under English rule.
10. Codified in The Irish Free State (Saorstat Eireann) Constitution Act, 1922, 13
Geo. 5, ch. 1, reprinted in 4 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES
OF ENGLAND
641 (A. Yonge 3d ed.
1968).
11. 4 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES
OF ENGLAND
642 (A. Yonge 3d ed. 1968).
12. IRISHCONST.art. 40.3.3.
13. The final step occurred in 1948 when the Irish Free State left the British Commonwealth of Nations. I t is now internationally recognized as the Republic of Ireland.
See The Ireland Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 41, reprinted in 4 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND
670 (A. Yonge 3d ed. 1968).
14. IRISHCONST.art. 50.1.
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riages" provisions of the Offences Against the Person Act were
carried over into Irish law by the new constitution.
Although sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the
Person Act specifically prohibit abortion in Ireland, there have
been few prosecution^.'^ In 1945 William Henry Coleman was
charged with two counts of attempting to perform an abortion.I6
He was found guilty and sentenced to fifteen years of penal servitude on each count with the sentences to run concurrently.
The most infamous Irish abortionist was a woman known as
Nurse Cadden, who "was a well known figure . . . on the Dublin
scene for 20 years."17 Her medical services came to an end in
1956, when she was convicted of murder after the body of a woman, who died following an abortion, was found on the public
footpath outside her apartment.ls Nurse Cadden was sentenced
to death, but the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.
In neither of these cases, nor in any other case to date, has
an Irish court analyzed the scope of sections 58 and 59." However, the English courts have analyzed these sections and an examination of their analysis is instructive because of its potentially persuasive influence on Irish law.
The most pertinent case is Rex v. Bourne.20 Dr. Aleck
Bourne, a respected obstetrician, performed an abortion on a
fourteen-year-old girl who had been violently raped. Dr. Bourne
stated that he felt he had a duty to perform the abortion after
deciding that continuance of the pregnancy would probably
cause her serious injury.21 Justice MacNaghten, in his instructions to the jury, stated that since sections 58 and 59 used the
word "unlawfully" in relation to procuring a miscarriage, it implied that procuring a miscarriage would not be "unlawful" in
certain circumstances. In defining these circumstances he borrowed language from the Infant Life (Preservation) Act of
15. P. JACKSON.
THEDEADLY
SOLUTION
TO AN IRISH
PROBLEM-BACKSTREET
ABORTION
2 (1983) (published by the Women's Right To Choose Campaign). Jackson suggested
that there have been 58 illegal abortion cases investigated or tried in Ireland between
1926 and 1974.
16. People v. Coleman, 1945 Ir. R. 237 (Crim. App. 1944) (the conviction was later
reversed on other grounds).
17. P. JACKSON,
supra note 15, at 4.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Binchy, Ethical Issues in Reproductive Medicine: A Legal Perspective, in ETHICAL ISSUESIN REPRODUCTIVE
MEDICINE
95, 102 (M. Reidy ed. 1982).
20. [I9391 1 K.B. 687.
21. Id. at 688.
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1929,22which provided that the killing of a child capable of being born alive was not an offense if the act was done "in good
faith for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother."23
Though sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person
Act did not provide such an exception, Justice MacNaghten interpreted the Act as though it did. He added that this standard
ought to be given a reasonable interpretation:
[I]f the doctor is of opinion, on reasonable grounds and with
adequate knowledge, that the probable consequence of the continuance of the pregnancy will be to make the woman a physical or mental wreck, the jury are [sic] quite entitled to take the
view that the doctor who, under those circumstances and in
that honest belief, operates, is operating for the purpose of preserving the life of the mother.='

Based on this sweeping instruction, the jury acquitted Dr.
Bourne.26
The impact of Bourne on Irish law is unclear. It is not binding precedent and opinions vary about its persuasive value. William Binchy, a member of the Irish Law Reform Commission,
and an authority on Irish family law stated:
I t will be recalled that that decision [Bourne] held that necessity was a defence to a prosecution for abortion, and that an
abortion performed to save the life of the mother would thus
be permissible. It seems that this part of the judgment would
represent the law in this country. But where that judgment
went on to hold that an abortion would be lawful if designed to
save the mother from becoming a "physical or mental wreck",
this would surely not represent our law, since i t goes far beyond what the defence of necessity can e n c o m p a s ~ . ~ ~

On the other hand, Father Bernard Treacy, a staunch anti-abortion campaigner noted:
However, the judge did state that the words "for the purpose only of preserving the life of the mother" represented the
common law, and thus were implicit in the 1861 Act by virtue
of the word "unlawfully".
If these words do represent the pre-1861 common law, it
22. 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 34, reprinted in 8 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES
OF ENGLAND
304 (A.
Yonge 3d ed. 1969).
23. Infant Life (Preservation) Act of 1929, 19 & 20 Geo. 5, ch. 34, 5 l(1).
24. [I9391 1 K.B. at 694.
25. Id. at 696.
26. Binchy, supra note 19, at 103.
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could be argued that they thereby declare the position in Irish
law. If so, an Irish court could validly adopt the view that procuring a miscarriage would not be "unlawful" in regard to Section 58 of The Offences Against the Person Act if it were procured in good faith for the purpose only of preserving the life
of the mother. However, the doctrine in [sic] unclear; and,clarification would be welcome.27

However, it is clear that Bourne opened the door to the liberalization of abortion laws in England. In 1967, in response to
the
' English Parliathe thalidomide tragedy of the early 1 9 6 0 ~ , ~
ment, with the encouragement of the Abortion Law Reform Association, passed The Abortion Act.29The Act provided:
l(1) . . . [A] person shall not be guilty of an offence under the
law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated
by a registered medical practitioner if two registered
medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good
faith(a) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve
risk to the life of the pregnant woman, or of injury
to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, greater
than if the pregnancy were terminated; or
(b) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were
born it would suffer from such physical or mental
abnormalities as to be seriously handi~apped.~'

The Abortion Act did not overrule sections 58 and 59 of the
Offences Against the Person Act; however, it significantly narrowed the definition of what an unlawful abortion entailed.31
Furthermore, although the Abortion Act, as an act of the British
Parliament, has no legally binding effect in Ireland, it has had a
significant impact in that an increasing number of Irish women
27. Treacy, The Constitution and Right to Life, in ABORTION
AND LAW74, 80 (A.
Flannery ed. 1983).
28. For a complete account of the Abortion Law Reform Association and the impact
of the thalidomide tragedy on the movement to reform abortion law in England, see K.
HINDELL
& M. SIMMS.
ABORTION
LAWREFORMED
108 (1971).
29. 1967, ch. 87.
30. Id. •˜ l(l)(a)-(b).
31. Effectively, abortion is now available on demand in England. Official statistics
indicate that in the last three months of 1983 there were 37,628 abortions performed.
OFFICE
OF POPULATION
CENSUSES
& SURVEYS,
OPCS MONITOR
(August 7, 1984).
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are now having safe, lawful, and relatively inexpensive abortions
in English clinics.32

A modern trend toward liberalization of abortion laws in
western democracieP caused conservative Irish lawyers and
doctors to be concerned that the Irish abortion laws might be
subject to change. Much of this concern was due to the fact that
the Irish Constitution provided no explicit protection for the unborn child. Article 40.3 provides:
(1)

(2)

The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and as far as
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.
The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best
it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice
done, vindicate the life, person, good name, and property
rights of every ~itizen.~'

However, these provisions only apply to "citizens." The constitution provides that citizenship is "determined in accordance
with law."s6 The law defining citizenship is contained in the
Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act and provides:
Every person born in Ireland is an Irish citizen from
birth.
(2) Every person is an Irish citizen if his father or mother
was an Irish citizen a t the time of that person's birth or
becomes an Irish citizen under subsection (1) or would be
an Irish c i t i z e n under that subsection if alive a t the passing of this
(1)

Although it is clear from this language that an unborn child is
not a citizen, the Irish Supreme Court in State (Nicolaou) u. An
Bord U ~ h t a l aleft
~ ~ open the possibility of affording constitutional protection for a noncitizen. Nicolaou, a British subject,
32. In 1968 fewer than 100 Irish women had abortions in English clinics, whereas by
the end of 1981, the number had risen to almost 4,000. MEDICO-SOCIAL
RESEARCH
BOARD,
TERMINATION
OF PREGNANCY,
ENGLAND
1983, WOMEN
FROMTHE REPUBLIC
OF IRELAND
9
(1984) (citing MEDICO-SOCIAL
RESEARCH
BOARD,
ANNUAL
REPORT
49 (1982)).
33. Abortion was legalized in England in 1967, the United States in 1973, France in
1975, Germany in 1976, Italy in 1978, and Holland in 1981. 340 DAILDEB.1585 (1983).
arts. 40.3.1 & 40.3.2.
34. IRISHCONST.
35. Id. art. 9.1.2.
36. PUB.GEN.ACTS,no. 26, 55 6(1) & (2) (1956).
37. 1966 1r. R. 567.
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sought a court order to prevent the adoption of his illegitimate
son. He claimed that the Adoption Act was unconstitutional because it violated his rights as a natural father. The court stated:
"This Court expressly reserves for another and more appropriate
case consideration of the effect of non-citzenship upon the interpretation of the Articles in question . . . ."38 Even if Article 40.3
were interpreted to apply to noncitizens, it would take quite a
liberal interpretation of the word "citizen" to encompass the unborn
The parameters of the constitutional rights of the unborn
became less clear following decisions of the Irish Supreme Court
that provided constitutional protection of individual personal
rights that were not explicitly granted in the constitution. This
trend began in 1963 with Ryan v. Attorney GeneraL40 Mrs.
Ryan sought to have the Health (Floridation of Water Supplies)
The supreme court afAct struck down as uncon~titutional.~~
firmed the high court's decision that, based on the facts, Mrs.
Ryan's suit could not succeed. However, the court confirmed
that the right to bodily integrity was included as part of the general constitutionally guaranteed personal rights.42 Quoting Justice Kenny of the high court, the supreme court held that "the
personal rights which may be invoked to invalidate legislation
are not confined to those specified in Article 40 but include all
38. Id. a t 645.
39. Heuston, Personal Rights under the Irish Constitution, 11 IRISHJURIST
205, 213
(1976), reprinted in 11 U. BRIT.COLUM.
L. REV.294, 304 (1977), stated in this regard:
The phrase "of the citizen" has given rise to difficulties here and elsewhere
throughout the fundamental rights Articles. At least two questions arise-first,
whether the constitutional guarantees extend to aliens and secondly, whether
they extend to artificial as distinct from natural persons. The Supreme Court
seems to be uncertain whether the constitutional guarantees protect aliens, although in one case on the matter (In Re Singer) [97 I.L.T.R. 130 (1960)l in
which the issue might have arisen, counsel for the State expressly disclaimed
any reliance on it. Clearly it would be very embarrassing for the Court, especially since the State has joined the European Economic Community, to be
obliged to hold that an alien was not entitled to the same degree of protection
as a citizen. On the other hand, simply as a matter of the interpretation of
words, it is very difficult to see how the word "citizen" can be held to mean
"any person whether a citizen or an alien."
40. 1965 Ir. R. 294.
41. The Health Act authorized the adding of flouride to public water in order to
protect against dental decay. Mrs. Ryan challenged the state action as an infringement
of (1) her parental rights to raise her children, and (2) her individual rights to personal
integrity. Id. a t 341.
42. Id. a t 295.
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those rights that flow from the Christian and democratic nature
of the State."43
The court soon recognized other personal
most notably the right of marital privacy recognized in the 1973
landmark decision of McGee u. Attorney General.45 In three
years Mrs. McGee bore four children, two of them twins. Mrs.
McGee had a long history of medical problems and each of her
pregnancies had been difficult; she nearly lost her life while
pregnant with her second child. Her doctor advised her that another pregnancy would endanger her life, so she was fitted with a
diaphragm to be used with an intrauterine contraceptive jelly.46
She brought this action after a supply of contraceptive jelly she
was attempting to import from England was seized by customs
officials pursuant to the Criminal Law Amendment Act.47
Strangely, the Act prohibited the importation and sale of contraceptives, but not their use.48 By a four-to-one majority, the
supreme court held that the importation restriction was a violation of the right to marital privacy provided by articles 40.3.1
and 41.1 of the Irish C o n s t i t u t i ~ n . ~ ~
Those opposed to abortion were not so much concerned by
the narrow holding of McGee as they were by the cases the court
cited as support for the decision. The court relied extensively on
two United States Supreme Court decisions, Griswold u. ConnecticutS0 and Eisenstadt u. B ~ i r d . ~Inl Griswold, the United
States Supreme Court held that the right of married persons to
use contraceptives was part of the constitutionally protected
Eisenstadt extended that right to the
right of marital
43. Id. a t 312.
44. See State (Healy) v. Donoghue, 1976 Ir. R. 325 (the right to justice and fair
procedure); Murtagh Properties v. Cleary, 1972 Ir. R. 330 (the right to work & earn a
livelihood); I n re Haughey, 1971 Ir. R. 217 (the right to defend one's name).
45. 1974 Ir. R. 284.
46. Id.
47. PUB.GEN.ACTS,no. 6 (1935).
48. Id. $ 17(1) provides, "It shall not be lawful for any person to sell, or expose,
offer, advertise, or keep for sale or to import or attempt to import into Saorstat Eireann
for sale, any contraceptive."
49. 1974 Ir. R. at 284-85. IRISHCONST.art. 40.3.1 states, "The State guarantees in its
laws to respect, and as far as practicable, by its law to defend and vindicate the personal
rights of the citizen." Article 41.1.1 states, "The state recognizes the family as the natural, primary and fundamental unit group of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law."
50. 381 US. 479 (1965).
51. 405 US. 438 (1972).
52. 381 US. a t 484-86.
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unmarried,53and was the stepping-stone from Griswold to one of
the major United States abortion decisions, Roe v. Wade.54 In
Roe, the United States Supreme Court held that the word "person", as used in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, did not include the unborn child.55 The United
States Supreme Court also held that the constitutionally protected right to privacy was "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her p r e g n a n ~ y . " ~ ~
The American cases disturbed conservative Irish lawyers67
and doctors because of the similarity of the equal protection
clauses of the United States and Irish constitution^.^^ It was
feared that McGee would lead to the liberalization of abortion
laws in Ireland, particularly since the Irish Supreme Court looks
upon the decisions of the United States Supreme Court with the
greatest of respect.69
It is questionable whether these concerns were justified.
Justice Walsh, speaking for the court in McGee, addressed the
abortion issue in somewhat veiled terms: "[Alny action on the
53. 405 U.S. a t 453-54.
54. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For an interesting look a t how Justice Brennan prompted
Justice Blackmun with a reference to Eisenstadt to assist him in bridging the gap from
& S. ARMSTRONG.
THEBRETHREN
175-76 (1979).
Griswold to Roe see B. WOODWARD
55. 410 U.S. a t 157.
56. Id. a t 153.
57. THEIRISHASSOCIATION
OF LAWYERS
FOR THE DEFENCE
OF THE UNBORN.
NEWSLETTER 2 (1983) stated, "The great abortion debate in America grew around the word 'person' and whether or not the word 'person' extended to include the unborn child. The
similarity to our own situtation is disturbing."
58. IRISHCONST.art. 40.1 provides, "All citizens shall, as human persons, be held
before the law. This shall not be held to mean that the state shall not in its enactments
have due regard to differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social function."
59. In O'Brien v. Stoutt, No. 326413 (High Ct. May 5, 1982), Justice D'Arcy said that
"decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States will always be received by this
Court with the greatest of respect." See Binchy, The Need for a Constitutional Amend& LAW116, 121, n.16 (A. Flannery ed. 1983); see also State (Quinn) v.
ment, in ABORTION
Ryan, 1965 Ir. R. 70. Justice Walsh stated:
I reject the submission that because upon the foundation of the State our
Courts took over an English legal system and the common law that the Courts
must be deemed to have adopted and should now adopt an approach to Constitutional questions conditioned by English judicial methods and English legal
training which despite their undoubted excellence were not fashioned for interpreting written constitutions or reviewing the constitutionality of legislation.
In this state one would have expected that if the approach of any Court of final
appeal of another State was to have been held up as an example for this Court
to follow it would more appropriately have been the Supreme Court of the
United States rather than the House of Lords.
Id. a t 126.
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part of either husband and wife or of the State to limit family
sizes by endangering or destroying human life must necessarily
not only be an offence against the common good but also against
the guaranteed personal rights of that human life in q u e s t i ~ n . " ~ ~
McGee was decided eleven months after Roe, and Justice Walsh,
presumably aware of this major decisionY6'appeared to stress
that McGee was a narrow decision that selectively recognized
the right of married couples to use contraceptives and it was not
to be interpreted as anything more. Six years later, Justice
Walsh was even more explicit in G. u. An Bord U c h t a l ~ : ~ ~
[A child] has the right to life itself and the right to be guarded
against all threats directed to its existence whether before or
after birth. . . . The right to life necessarily implies the right to
be born, the right to preserve and defend (and to have preserved and defended) that life . . . .63

Despite these dicta the potential effect of McGee on Irish
abortion law remains open to debate.64Professor James Casey of
University College Dublin Law School stated, "Those who argue
that since the matrimonial privacy of Griswold u. Connecticut
60. 1974 Ir. R. a t 312.
61. Surprisingly, one leading commentator has suggested that the Irish Supreme
Court was unaware of the Roe decision. W. Binchy, Sexual Behavior and the Law in
Ireland 22 n.70 (1978) (unpublished manuscript). This seems inconsistent with the publicity surrounding Roe and the deference given by the Irish Supreme Court to United
States Supreme Court decisions. See supra note 59.
62. 1980 Ir. R. 32.
63. Id. a t 69.
64. Proponents of the prolife amendment have rejected the persuasive value of these
dicta:
Whilst these views expressed by the learned judge are encouraging they do not
in themselves, of course, afford any adequate legal Constitutional protection
for the unborn. The other judges in these decisions made it clear that they
were not expressing any view on this issue. Obiter dicta bind no judge in any
subsequent decision, not even the judge who made them originally. Mr. Justice
Walsh would be the first to acknowledge that his view could not bind the
Court in a future decision: as he pointed out in McGee's case, constitutional
interpretation is not rooted in the past but is a continuous process through
time.
THEIRISHASSOCIATION
OF LAWYERS
FOR THE DEFENCE
OF THE UNBORN,
NEWSLETTER
2
(1983). Professor Kelly, a constitutional law professor and member of the Irish Parliament, thinks otherwise.
Obiter dicta in cases of this importance are not lightly uttered, they are regarded as the next best thing to a binding authority and are freely cited in
court by counsel. They are treated for all practical purposes as though they
were authority, even though they do not have a status in the ordinary
heirarchy of binding precedent that we respect here.
339 DAILDEB.1399 (1983).
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led to the proabortion decision in Roe u. Wade, the same must
follow here from McGee u. A.G. are guilty of an absurdly
mechanical view of the judicial process."6s Professor James
O'Reilly, another professor of law at University College Dublin
Law School, was even more assertive in declaring, "One wonders
if the commentators who regard the finding of a right to abortion lurking behind McGee have actually read that decision and
noticed not only the small print but the implications of the
small print."" Referring to such people as "prophets of doom,"
he concluded, "Any commentator who seriously suggests that
one can expect the Irish Supreme Court to arrive at a situation
similar to Roe u. Wade or Doe u. Bolton simply has not read the
Irish Constitution, the judgment in McGee, nor understands all
the issues involved."67
Professor Binchy, a key figure in the movement for a prolife
amendment, saw it otherwise:
In my view, these commentators are guilty of too much vigour
in ridiculing the possible developments in this country. No one
seriously suggests that our Supreme Court would tomorrow
recognise a constitutional right to abortion. Equally clearly,
however, attitudes among the judiciary towards abortion may
change in the coming years. If this happens, the introduction
by McGee of the privacy concept into our jurisprudence may
well serve to assist the constitutional case for abortion. Without such a concept, the constitutional argument in favour of
abortion would be that much more difficult to e~tablish.~'

Additionally, there were concerns among staunch anti-abortionists that Ireland, as a signator and contracting party to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, might be obligated to modify its laws in relation to
abortion. This could happen if article two of the Convention,
which states that "[e]veryone's right to life shall be protected by
law,"6s were interpreted by the European Commission on
Human Rights as giving women a limited right to abortion.
65. Casey, The Development of Constitutional Law Under Chief Justice O'Dalaigh,
1978 DUBLIN
U.L.J. 3, 10.
8, 17 (1977).
66. O'Reilly, Marital Privacy & Family Law, 65 STUDIES
67. Id. at 22.
68. Binchy, supra note 19, at 104.
69. CONVENTION
FOR THE PROTECTION
OF HUMAN
RIGHTSAND PERSONAL
FREEDOMS,
art. 2(1) [hereinafter cited as CONVENTION],
reprinted in J. FAWCETT.
THEAPPLICATION
OF
THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION
ON HUMAN
RIGHTS29 (1969).
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Prolife supporters argued that Ireland would be required to
comply with such a finding, since article 53 of the Convention
provides, "The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by
the decision of the Court in any case to which they are
parties."'O
Fears that abortion might be legalized in Ireland were also
increased by statistics showing an increase in the number of
Irish women having abortions in England from 64 in 1968 to
more than 3,600 in 1981.'l Such figures lent credibility to fears
that Irish legislators might be more willing to adopt some form
of abortion legislation, particularly in light of references to therapeutic abortion made previously in Irish parliamentary
debates.'*
Proposals (1) to extend jurisdiction to allow criminal prosecution of Irish women who had abortions abroad, (2) to enjoin
women from leaving Ireland for abortions, and (3) to criminally
prosecute abortion referral agencies were dismissed as either unmanageable or ~ndesireable.'~Conservative lawyers considered
an amendment to the constitution as more effective in preserving the existing laws against ab~rtion.'~They argued that an
amendment would have the double effect of prohibiting the Oireachtas from introducing abortion legislation, while at the same
time preventing the Irish Supreme Court from holding that sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act were
unc~nstitutional.'~

In light of these developments, on April 27, 1981 "a group of
organisations acting with the full support of the Professors of
Obstetrics and Gynaecology in the Irish Univer~ities"'~launched
70. CONVENTION,
supra note 69, art. 53, reprinted in J. FAWCET~,
supra note 69, at
337.
NOW 69
71. O'Leary, The Management of Problem Pregnancies, in ABORTION
(1983). These figures only represent the number of Irish women having abortions at English clinics who used their Irish addresses.
72. See SEN.DEB.560-62 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1973). 354-56 (daily ed. Feb. 21, 1974).
73. Binchy, supra note 19, at 106-08; see generally Findlay, Criminal Liability for
Complicity in Abortions Committed Outside Ireland, 15 IRISHJURIST88 (1980).
74. Binchy, supra note 19, at 108.
75. THE IRISHASSOCIATION
OF LAWYERS
FOR THE DEFENCE
OF THE UNBORN,
THE
ABORTION
REFERENDUM
2 (1983).
76. SEN.DEB.554-55 (daily ed. May 4, 1983) (citing a news release entitled Campaign for Pro-Life Amendment to the Constitution, Apr. 27, 1981).
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the campaign for a constitutional amendment to protect the life
of the unborn. Under the Irish Constitution, an amendment
must be initiated as a bill in the Dail (house of representatives),
passed by both Houses of the Oireachtas, and submitted by referendum to the people.77 The amendment is considered approved if it receives a majority of the votes in the referend~m.'~
Because of these constitutional requirements, the Pro-life
Amendment Campaign (PLAC) sought the support of the leading political parties for an amendment to the constitution that
would provide for an "absolute right to life."79
The campaign was timed perfectly because a general election was called within six weeks of its inception. Opposition to
the amendment by any political party might have been interpreted by the electorate as a proabortion stance-a position no
party could afford in a country that is ninety-five percent Catholi~.~O
Three weeks after the campaign had been launched, the
Fianna Fail Government and the opposition Fine Gael Party
publicly stated that they were totally and unalterably opposed
to abortion and promised to introduce an amendment to the
c o n s t i t u t i ~ n The
. ~ ~ other major party, Labour, stated that it was
"unequivocally opposed to abortion and would give serious consideration" to the idea of an amendment.82
The Fine Gael Party achieved a narrow victory in the June
77. IRISHCONST.art. 46.2.
78. Id. art. 47.1.
79. SEN.DEB.555 (daily ed. May 4, 1983) (citing a news release entitled Campaign
for Pro-Life Amendment to the Constitution, Apr. 27, 1981). The statement provided:
While the precise wording of the actual amendment will be a matter for
others, in accordance with legal advice available to us it is proposed that it be
along the following lines:
"The State recognises the absolute right to life of every unborn child from
conception, and accordingly guarantees to respect and protect such rights by
law."
80. W. Binchy, supra note 61, a t 1 n.2.
81. The official Fianna Fail statement read:
The Government are [sic] totally opposed to abortion, and an appropriate constitutional amendment to give effect to the position will be brought forward as
soon as circumstances permit. The Government will also continue to take the
necessary steps to prevent abortion referral and seek to alleviate the causes
which may lead to abortion.
Pro-Life Amendment Campaign, Information Sheet No. 2 (June 1981). The Fine Gael
Party statement stated, "Fine Gael is unalterably opposed to the legalisation of abortion
and in Government will initiate a referendum to guarantee the right to life of the unborn
child. Fine Gael recognises that a pro-life policy places an obligation upon us to support
the single mother." Id.
82. Id.
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election. Once in power the new Taoiseach (prime minister),
Garret FitzGerald, confirmed his party's preelection commitment to the amendment,s3 but lacked the time to act because a
second general election restored power to the Fianna Fail party
in March 1982.s4 In November of the same year, the third general election in eighteen months was called.s5 The narrowly
elected governments and the successive election campaigns enabled the organizers of PLAC to exert pressure on deputies
(members of parliament) and aspiring deputies to support a constitutional amendment.
On November 2, 1982, during its final days in power, Fianna
Fail introduced a bills6 that proposed what eventually became
the wording of the amendment. It provided, "The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard
to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to
respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right."87
Within days, the Fine Gael Party issued a statement supporting the wording of the amendment,ss and FitzGerald stated
that the wording was "about as good a formula as you could
get."8B He later regretted this statement.
The third general election also failed to produce a clear winner. This caused Fine Gael and Labour to form a coalition government that continues in power today.B0By this time, liberal
members of Fine Gael and Labour were beginning to be concerned about the wording of the abortion referendum. It was
83. The Prime Minister stated: "The Government is unalterably opposed to the
legalisation of abortion and is committed to taking whatever steps are necessary to ensure that an appropriate amendment is brought forward. The Attorney General is now
examining the form such an amendment might take." Letter from Garret FitzGerald to
Dr. Julia Vaughan (Aug. 5, 1981), reprinted in SEN.DEB.557 (daily ed. May 4,1983) (Dr.
Julia Vaughan was chairman of PLAC).
84. N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1982, a t 3, col. 4.
85. Under the Irish system of government, a general election is called if the National
Parliament, by a simple majority, gives a vote of "no confidence" in the government.
86. Eighth Amendment to the Constitution Bill (1982).
87. Eighth Amendment of the Constitution Act, 1983, pt. 11.
88. 339 DAILDEB. 1374 (1983) (quoting a statement issued by Fine Gael Party on
Wednesday, Nov. 3, 1982). The statement declared, "The Fine Gael Party welcomes the
form of the Amendment to the Constitution proposed by the Government. The Amendment as proposed is worded in positive terms, designed to strengthen the Constitutional
protection of life, as proposed by the leader of Fine Gael . . . ."
89. SEN.DEB. 860 (daily ed. May 11, 1983) (quoting from a transcript of "Today
Tonight," Radio Telefis Eireann [Irish National Television], November 4, 1982).
90. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1982, a t 14, col. 3.
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feared that the amendment might provide for an absolute, unequivocal right to life. There was also discomfort a t the growing
criticisms from protestant churches about the matter and apprehension that the amendment would not fit into the Prime Minister's plans for a pluralist, secular state.s1 As a result, the coalition government refused to support the amendment as it was
worded, arguing that it was sectarian and ambiguou~.'~This
spawned a national controversy described by one commentator
as "our moral civil war."s3
A major division soon emerged. The prolife groups consisted
of conservative members of the legal and medical profession.
Such groups were strongly supported by the Fianna Fail Party
and the Catholic
The anti-amendment groups were a
loose coalition of proclioice groups-feminists, trade unions, and
liberal politicians-and
somewhat more conservative groups
made up of politicians, concerned members of the legal and
medical professions, and most of the protestant churches and la91. Uniting the Catholic Right, in "THE ABORTION
REFERENDUM"-THECASE
AGAINST
13, 23 (M.Arnold & P. Kirby eds. 1983).
92. See 339 DAILDEB.1353-68 (1983).
Sept. 3, 1984, a t 39, 40 (quoting an
93. Rights for the Unborn, THE ECONOMIST,
editorial in The Irish Press, Aug. 29, 1983).
94. The Catholic Church enthusiastically encouraged its members to vote for the
amendment. In a letter read to all Catholic congregations in the Dublin diocese on Sunday, Apr. 10, 1983, Archbishop Ryan stated:
Attempts have been made to raise issues which have little or nothing to do
with the central point. Sectarianism has been mentioned, as if it were a question of deciding between the views of various churches. It is not. The question
is whether the people of Ireland want, or do not want, to give to the unborn
child a greater legal protection than it has a t present. This is not in any sense a
"Church" matter. It is rather a matter of the basic human right to life. It can
hardly be called "sectarian" to say that this right to life belongs to all, not just
to some.
Letter from Archbishop Ryan to all Catholic congregations in the Dublin diocese (Apr. 4,
1983).
A statement from the Irish Episcopal conference concluded: "A decisive 'Yes' to the
Amendment will, we believe, in the words of Pope John Paul I1 in Limerick, constitute a
'witness before Europe and before the whole world to the dignity and sacredness of all
human life, from conception until death.' " The Amendment-A Statement from the
Irish Episcopal Conference, (Veritas Publications Aug. 22, 1983).
Finally, a statement by the Archbishop of Dublin, Dr. Ryan, read a t all Catholic
churches three days before the national referendum concluded:
Over the last few weeks many people have been asking me for guidance. My
advice to them, and to all of you, is that a "Yes" vote on Wednesday will protect the right to life of the unborn child; it will not create a threat to expectant
mothers; it will block any attempt to legalise abortion in this country.
Letter from Archbishop Ryan to all Catholic congregations in the Dublin diocese (Sept.
1, 1983).
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ity, who, although opposed to the introduction of abortion legislation, either opposed the need for an amendment or objected to
its sectarian nature."
Allegations of sectarianism resulted from the similarities in
the proposed amendment to the Catholic doctrine of "double effect." This doctrine, which permits an operation to remove a woman's cancerous womb with the resultant inevitable death of the
fetus, is based on the rationale that the primary intention-the
removal of a diseased organ-justifies the secondary effect-the
death of the fetus.96 Right wing prolife supporters argued that
such actions are not abortions but are merely unfortunate consequences that result from such operations. Dr. Julia Vaughan,
Chairman of the Pro-Life Amendment Campaign explained:
Doctors who participate in these procedures are not performing
abortions. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that they are
not abortions in either medical or legal terms. In each case, the
removal of a pathological organ is carried out to save women's
life, not in order to kill the fetus. The pregnancy is not directly
attacked, even though its loss may be the inevitable consequence of treatment which has as its objective the "good" of
saving the life of the mother."

Prolife supporters argued that the rights of the unborn were absolute and unequivocal, and that no exceptions existed to a general prohibition on abortion.98 Protestants and prochoice supporters considered this a flagrant attempt by right wing prolife
supporters who, while claiming to be nonsectarian, were attempting to have the permissible parameters of Irish abortion
law defined in a very Roman Catholic way."
In contrast, Fine Gael's opposition was directed toward the
wording of the amendment. The Director of Public Prosecutions
and the Attorney General issued statements that mirrored these
concerns. The Director of Public Prosecution stated that while
he would have no difficulty prosecuting an unlawful abortion
under the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act, he would expe95. For a sizeable but not exhaustive list of statements, see Protestant Churches'
Statements, in "THE ABORTION
REFERENDUM"-THE
CASEAGAINST
61-65 (M. Arnold &
P. Kirby eds. 1983).
96. Uniting the Catholic Right, supra note 91.
97. J. Vaughan, Pro-Life Amendment Campaign-A Response to Prof. O'Mahony
(May 19, 1982).
REFERENDUM"-THECASE
98. O'Mahony, A Catholic View, in "THE ABORTION
AGAINST
35, 37 (M. Arnold & P. Kirby eds. 1983).
99. Id.
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rience "grave difficulty" in maintaining prosecutions in many
cases if the amendment passed.loO T h e Attorney General attacked the wording of the amendment.
[The] wording is ambiguous and unsatisfactory. It will lead inevitably to confusion and uncertainty, not merely amongst the
medical profession, to whom it has of course particular relevance, but also amongst lawyers and more specifically the
judges who will have to interpret it. Far from providing the
protection and certainty which is sought by many of those who
have advocated its adoption, it will have a contrary effect.
In particular it is not clear as to what life is being protected; as to whether "the unborn" is protected from the moment of fertilisation or alternatively is left unprotected until
an independently viable human being exists at 25 to 28 weeks.
Further, having regard to the equal rights of the unborn
and the mother, a doctor faced with the dilemma of saving the
life of the mother, knowing that to do so will terminate the life
of "the unborn," will be compelled by the wording to conclude
that he can do nothing. Whatever his intentions, he will have
to show equal regard for both lives, and his predominent intent
will not be a factor.
In those circumstances I cannot approve of the wording
proposed.'O1
Fianna Fail, the party that proposed the wording of the
amendment, and the members of PLAC maintained that the
wording was adequate to protect the rights of the unborn. They
argued t h a t there was no justification for the "needless anxiety"
t h a t had been generated concerning the consequences of the
amendment's adoption.lo2 T h e Irish Association of Lawyers for
the Defence of the Unborn stated bluntly, "We unequivocally
maintain that there is nothing in the original wording which
would oblige a n Irish Court t o make such a grotesque decision a s
that suggested by Mr. Sutherland [Attorney General]."lo3
On April 27, 1983, in response t o these concerns, Fine Gael
introduced a more simply worded version of the amendment
which stated, "Nothing in this Constitution shall be invoked to
invalidate, or to deprive of force or effect any provision of a law
100. 340 DAILDEB.474 (1983) (statement of the Director of Public Prosecutions).
101. SEN.DEB.520 (daily ed. May 4, 1983) (statement of Attorney General, Mr. Peter D. Sutherland, S.C., quoted from The Irish Times, Feb. 16, 1983).
102. SEN DEB 1265 (daily ed. May 26, 1983).
103. Id. (quoting statement of The Irish Association of Lawyers for the Defence of
the Unborn).
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on the ground that it prohibits abortion."lo4 Fine Gael argued
that this wording avoided the multiple interpretations of the Fianna Fail amendment and made it easier for the public to understand. At the same time, the proposal fulfilled Fine Gael's
commitment to introduce an amendment to the constitution
that would prohibit the introduction of abortion in Ireland.lo5
However, the wording proposed by Fine Gael proved unacceptable because it did not preclude future legislative repeal of the
1861 Act and provision for some form of legalized abortion. As a
result, the Fine Gael proposal was soundly defeated.lo6
Several other proposals to clarify the wording of the original
amendment were also presented in the Dail. These included: (I)
a proposal to delete the word "unborn" and substitute "unborn
human being,"lo7 (2) a proposal to delete "with due regard to the
equal right to life of the mother7' and substitute "subject to the
right of the mother to life and bodily integrity,"lo8 and (3) a proposal to insert after "practicable" the words "without interference with any existing right or lawful opportunity of any citizen."lo9 Each proposal was soundly defeated.l1•‹ Similar
proposals were made in the Senate (1)to modify the wording of
the amendment by inserting "which shall not include the fertilised ovum prior to the time a t which such fertilised ovum becomes implanted in the wall of the uterus" after the word "unborn"ll' and (2) to delete the word "equal" and substitute the
word "prior."l12 Each of these proposals was also defeated.
The amendment, as originally worded by Fianna Fail,
passed overwhelmingly in the Dail,l13 with Fine Gael abstaining
from the vote and Labour voting against it. Thereafter, Garret
FitzGerald, the Taoiseach, issued a statement expressing his regret that he had supported the idea of an amendment. FitzGerald asked the people to vote against the amendment because it
104. 341 DAILDEB.2001 (1983).
105. SEN.DEB 935 (daily ed. May 18, 1983).
106. 341 DAILDEB.2225-30 (1983).
107. Id. at 2229.
108. Id. at 2230.
109. Id. a t 2231.
110. Id. at 2233-38.
111. SEN.DEB 1092 (daily ed. May 25, 1983). The proposal was defeated by a vote of
18 to 10. Id. at 1149-50.
1.12. Id. at 1154. The proposal was defeated by a vote of 15 to 8, SEN.DEB.1281-82
(daily ed. May 26, 1983).
2235-38 (1983).
113. 341 DAILDEB.
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was "ambiguous and unclear"'14 and could lead to the death of
women "whose lives are now saved in all hospitals in accordance
with universal medical practi~e.""~Despite FitzGerald7splea, on
September 7, 1983, in one of the smallest voter turnouts in Irish
history, the electorate voted by a two-to-one majority to include
the amendment in the Irish Constit~tion."~
IV.

IMPLICATIONS
OF THE AMENDMENT

The eighth amendment to the Irish Constitution grew out of
the desire of prolife groups and concerned citizens to further
protect the rights of the unborn. The challenge faced by the
drafters was to produce an amendment that would legally protect the rights of the unborn, while at the same time not create
an absolute right that would supersede the already guaranteed
personal rights of the citizen."'
Despite the powerful endorsement the amendment received
at the polls, it poses several problems. The most serious challenge is likely to be directed at thelanguage of the amendment
itself. The amendment guarantees the "right to life of the unborn" but fails to indicate at what point that "unborn" life begins. Admittedly, this is not an easy question, but it is a fundamental question that must be answered. The United States
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wadells noted that due to the "wide
divergence of thinking" among philosophers, theologians and
physicians, it could not resolve the "difficult question of when
life begins."l19 Yet, the United States Supreme Court's failure to
resolve the question combined with their refusal to protect the
fetus until the time of viability (24-28 weeks) practically resulted in recognition that life does not exist prior to that time.
114. Keenan, A Verbal War of Morality, MACLEAN'S,
Sept. 19, 1983, a t 53.
115. Kirby, A Pyrrhic Victory-Disarray Over Abortion, COMMONWEAL,
Oct. 7, 1983,
a t 519, col. 1. As a result of this statement, the anti-amendment groups adopted the
slogan, "This amendment could kill women."
116. Id. a t 518. The turnout a t the polls was only 5470, extremely low compared to
the 70% plus that usually turn out to vote in Ireland. This may be a reflection of the
difficulty people had in deciding which way to vote. Significant, too, is that in Dublin the
vote was split almost evenly, with 48% for the amendment and 51% against, indicating
that the rural vote was mainly responsible for the passage of the amendment by the 2-1
margin.
AND LAW40,
117. O'Mahony, Medical Ethics in the Pluralistic State, in ABORTION
46 (A. Flannery ed. 1983).
118. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
119. Id. a t 159-60.
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This avoidance of the question of when life begins has been
sharply criticized by one Irish commentator:
This failure of either English or American law to resolve the
basic question of the humanity of the unborn child must be
criticised, whatever the true motives of the courts or legislature
may be. If, on the one hand, there is a genuine reluctance to
determine the issue, this may be criticised on the basis that the
question is so fundamental that it requires to be resolved
before any other subsidiary issues are determined. Moreover, a
Court which is too timid to resolve such a basic moral issue
could scarcely feel itself competent to determine other equally
important moral questions in the legal forum.
If, on the other hand, the apparent failure to determine
the issue amounts in reality to a decision that the unborn child
is not a human being, then the courts and legislature should
have the courage to say so clearly and be judged accordingly.
From the standpoint of the child, the failure to resolve the issue of his humanity amounts in result to a finding that he is
not a human being.lZ0
This criticism is particularly applicable t o the Irish legisla;ure because i t holds the exclusive constitutional power to make
laws for the state.121 This makes legislators responsible for vigorously debating the issues, considering all possible ramifications,
and coming up with the clearest language possible before
presenting to the people a proposed amendment of the constitution. This does not require legislators to determine the exact
moment when human life begins for all purposes. However, it
does require the election of a specific cognizable time a t which
the law is prepared t o protect the unborn's right to life.
T h e amendment's failure to define when the unborn is constitutionally protected means the judiciary will eventually have
t o formulate the definition; the very result the prolife campaigners sought t o avoid.122This has caused uncertainty about the effect of the amendment. T h e Attorney General has stated:
In the event that the Supreme Court is called upon to construe the proposal, it could come to a number of different conclusions as to the definition of the class which is afforded pro120. Binchy, supra note 19, a t 99 (emphasis in original).
121. IRISHCONST.art. 15.2.1 provides that "[tlhe sole and exclusive power of making
laws for the State is hereby vested in the Oireachtas: no other legislative authority has
power to make laws for the State."
122. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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tection. Undoubtedly a view which might commend itself to
the court is that all human beings fall within the ambit of the
amendment, and that a human being comes into existence
when the process of fertilisation is complete.
If, as would appear to be the case, it is correct to state that
certain contraceptives can operate after fertilisation, then these
would be abortifacient if human life commences on conception.
Thus the importation, dissemination and use of such contraceptives would be prohibited, and as an example, the use of the
"morning-after" pill in the treatment of rape victims will not
be permissable, nor will the use of such contraceptives in certain conditions of the health of a woman-e.g. valvular heart
disease or diabetes.

....
However, the point of time for which the most compelling
legal argument could be made, other than the time of fertilisation, as being the moment of commencement of protection,
could be said to be the time when the foetus becomes independently viable. I understand that this is probably at some time
between 25 and 28 weeks of pregnancy.
Such a construction could be supported by an argument
that "unborn" could be regarded as being applicable only to
something capable of being born. The word "unborn" used as a
noun must, as a matter of language, mean "unborn person",
"unborn child" or "unborn human being". It could be argued
that neither a fertilised ovum, a fertilised and implanted ovum,
an embryo or even a foetus prior to the time when it is independently viable, would come within this definition.
The consequences of such a finding could be that there
would be no constitutional prohibition on abortion prior to this
stage of pregnancy.lZ3

It is possible that a future Irish Supreme Court may choose
to interpret the amendment in a liberal manner, particularly if
Irish public opinion moves toward acceptance of some form of
abortion. This could place Ireland in a situation similar to that
of the United States where the generally proabortion courts
have thus far succeeded in liberalizing abortion legislation despite the contrary views of generally prolife legislatures. In reality, this is not likely to occur because of past developments in
123. SEN DEB 524-26 (daily ed May 4, 1983) (statement of Attorney General, Mr
Peter D. Sutherland, S.C., quoted from The Irish Times, Feb. 16, 1983)
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Irish family law and the happenings accompanying the movement to amend the constitution.
The justices cannot avoid being influenced by the strong
public stance against the introduction of abortion legislation in
Ireland. Even prior to passage of the amendment, the Irish Supreme Court intimated that the right to life of the unborn would
~~
dicta,12&these statements have not
be ~ r 0 t e c t e d . lAlthough
been challenged and cannot go unnoticed. Admittedly, the Irish
Supreme Court looks upon decisions of the United States Supreme Court with great respect,12'jand has even made extensive
use of American decisions in formulating the concept of marital
privacy in McGee.12' However, it does not necessarily follow that
the Irish Supreme Court will track the judicial trend developed
in the United States in relation to abortion. Past experience indicates the opposite may be true. In the decade since Roe, the
United States has become more liberal,lZ8while Ireland has become more conservative.
At most, the impact of McGee is limited to the 1979 passage
of the Health (Family Planning) Act,129which permits limited
access to contraceptives. In drafting the Health Act, the Irish
legislature clearly stated the Act was not to be used as a stepping-stone to some form of abortion legislation. Section 10 provides: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing . . .
the procuring of abortion . . . ."130 The act is so restrictive toward abortion that it provides that the Censorship Board may
ban a book that "advocates or might reasonably be supposed to
advocate the procurement of abortion or miscarriage or any
124. See supra notes 60 & 63 and accompanying text.
125 See supra note 64.
126 See supra note 59.
127 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
128 See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 103 S. Ct. 2481
(1983) (an abortion performed after the first trimester need not be performed in a hospltal, state may not Impose a blanket provlslon requiring parental consent for an abortion
for an unmarried minor; state cannot require instructions by attending physician as to
fetal development and alternatives to abortion); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1978)
(struck down a statute that requ~redpostviability abort~onst o be by such method as to
give the fetus the best opportunity of surviving); Planned Parenthood v Danforth, 428
U S. 52 (1976) (a woman's decision to have an abortion cannot be made subject to parental or spousal consent).
129. PUB GEN ACTS,no. 20 (1979).
130. Id •˜ 10(a).
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method, treatment or appliance to be used for the purpose of
such pr~curement."'~~
Other operative acts also suggest that the unborn child is a
persona judicata. Section 58 of the Civil Liability
provides for recovery, by a child, of damages for injuries caused
before birth: "For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby declared
that the law relating to wrongs shall apply to an unborn child
for his protection in like manner as if the child were born, provided the child is subsequently born alive."133 Similarly, the
Succession
gives inheritance rights to a child en ventre sa
mere who is not illegitimate, provided the child is subsequently
born a 1 i ~ e . l ~ ~
More significantly, the parliamentary debates during the
campaign to amend the constitution were devoid of any suggestion that abortion in any form ought to be legalized. Each of the
major parliamentary parties also publicly stated that they opposed ab0rti0n.l~~
Similarly, nearly all of the churches that released statements indicated their opposition to the introduction
of abortion legislation, and their support of the right to life of
the unborn.13' Moreover, the Irish people approved the amendment by a two-to-one margin.138Indeed, just four months before
the amendment inevitably passed,138the Irish Supreme Court, in
Norris u. Attorney General,140 a case concerning the constitutionality of legislation against homosexuality, commented on the
abortion issue. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice O'Higgins
stated:
A right to privacy or, as it has been put, a right "to be let
alone," can never be absolute. There are many acts done in priI d •˜ 12(1).
PUB GEN ACTS,no. 41, •˜ 58 (1961).
Id.
PUB GEN ACTS,no. 27 (1965).
I d •˜ 3(2).
See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 94-95.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
The Women's Right to Choose Campaign, in a recent discuss~onof their admendment campaign, admitted, "The function of our organization was to present a rlght
to choose argument against the amendment's provisions. We were in existence as a point
of principle-we had no illusions about the likely effectiveness of our propaganda."
Fighting for Control-The Ongozng Struggle for Reproductive Rights 7, 16, in THEIRISH
FEMINIST
REVIEW(Womens Community Press 1984).
140. W BINCHY,
A CASEBOOK
ON IRISHFAMILY
LAW(1984) (Ir Sup Ct., Apr. 22,
1983, as yet unreported in Ir. R.).
-

-
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vate which the State is entitled to condemn, whether such be
done by an individual on his own or with another. The law has
always condemned abortion, incest, suicide attempts, suicide
pacts, euthanasia or ,mercy killing. These are prohibited simply
because they are morally wrong and regardless of the fact,
which may exist in some instances, that no harm or injury to
others is involved.'"'

Justice McCarthy was even more effusive. In a dissenting opinion, he stated:
I cannot delimit the area in which the State may constitutionally intervene so as to restrict the right to privacy, nor can
I overlook the present public debate concerning the criminal
law, arising from the statute of 1861, as to abortion-the killing of an unborn child. I t is not an issue that arises in the instant case, but it may be claimed that the right of privacy of a
pregnant woman would extend to a right in her to terminate
pregnancy, an act which would involve depriving the unborn
child of the most fundamental right of all-the right to life
itself.'"*

He then suggested that the right to life of the unborn was protected by the preamble to the constitution that acknowledges
Jesus Christ and the principles of Chri~tianity."~He concluded:
For myself, I am content to say that the provisions of the
Preamble which I have quoted earlier in this judgment would
appear to lean heavily against any view other than that the
right to life of the unborn is a sacred trust to which all organs
of government must lend their support.14"

Against this background, it is unlikely that any member of the
141. Id. a t 379.
142. Id. a t 387.
143. IRISHCONST.preamble. It states:

In the name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to
Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men and States must be referred,
We the People of Eire [Ireland], Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to
our divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of
trial, Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting struggle to regain
the rightful independence of our Nation, And seeking to promote the common
good, with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured, true social order attained,
the unity of our country restored, and concord established with other nations,
Do hereby adopt, enact, and give to ourselves, this Constitution.
144. W. BINCHY,
supra note 140, at 387.
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Irish Supreme Court would interpret the amendment in such a
manner as to defeat the right to life of the ~ n b 0 r n . l ~ ~
The language of the amendment is deliberately general, just
as is every other article of the constitution. The amendment was
not intended to outline every possible eventuality, but rather to
give adequate guidelines to the courts to enable them to make
reasonable decisions.146The amendment is modelled after and
uses language nearly identical to that found in the constitutional
provision that protects the rights of the citizen. That provision
states: "The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and as far as
practicable by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal
rights of the citizen."147Because this wording has provided adequate protection for the rights of Irish citizens since 1937, it is
not surprising that similar wording was used to protect the
rights of the unborn.
Opponents of the amendment have also been critical of the
phrase "with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother."
The Attorney General elaborated:
The meaning of "with due regard to" is entirely unclear. These
words are generally perceived to allow for, at least, termination
of the life of the foetus in the cases of ectopic pregnancy or
cancer of the uterus. The words "with due regard to" have
been understood by many to suggest that the right to life enjoyed by the unborn was to be confined in some way. That interpretation is in my opinion incorrect. (The word
"comhcheart" in the Irish text is literally "the same right.")
The right to life of both the unborn and the mother is stated in
the proposed text to be equal, and in these circumstances I
cannot see how it could be possible knowingly to terminate the
existence of the unborn even if such termination were the secondary effect of an operation for another purpose.

....

If a doctor were to be faced with the choice as to saving
the life of one, and thereby terminating the life of the other,
then I believe that the only lawful conclusion to this dilemma
would be that he could do nothing, absolutely nothing, which
145. Similarly, criticism of the amendment because it may effectively ban contraceptives that are considered abortifacient is misguided since such contraceptives are already prohibited by the Health (Family Planning) Act. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
146. Society for the Protection of Unborn Children, The Pro-Life AmendmentQuestions and Answers, Fact Sheet No. 3 (1983).
art. 40.3.1.
147. IRISHCONST.
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infringed on either right. It is only where there is no possibility
of the foetus surviving, even without the doctor's intervention,
that no difficulty will a r i ~ e . " ~

While this argument is superficially appealing, the only alternative is to resolve the equality issue between the mother and
the unborn by giving one or the other greater rights. This
presents even greater difficulties. Affording greater rights to the
mother would cater to the prochoice lobby, which views the
rights of the mother as always superior to those of the unborn.
This is not in keeping with the purpose of the amendment to
further protect the right to life of the unborn. Conversely, affording greater rights to the unborn would cater to the right
wing prolife lobby, which views the rights of the unborn as absolute and unequivocal, with no exceptions save those covered by
the Catholic doctrine of double effect. This position is also unacceptable because there really is no such thing as an absolute
right to life. The common law, based on the biblical command,
"Thou shall not kill"14@admits to exceptions such as self-defense. The right to life of the unborn is subject to exceptions as
well. Even some staunch prolife supporters recognize this. Father Haring, a noted Catholic theologian, has stated:
I consider probable the opinion of those who justify the removal of a foetus that surely cannot survive, when the action is
taken in order to prevent grave damage to the mother. For instance, an anencephalic foetus not only cannot develop into a
conscious human life but cannot survive. To remove it in order
to spare great damage to the mother is truly therapeutic, while
no injustice is done to the life of the foetus already doomed to
death.lS0

Under these circumstances, the only logical solution was to
give both mother and unborn an equal statutory right to life,
allowing the judiciary to decide each case on the facts. The fact
that both mother and unborn have equal rights does not prevent
any action from being taken in cases of conflict as suggested by
the Attorney General. Such a conclusion defies common sense,
suggesting that if two patients needed a life support system to
148. SEN.DEB.540 (daily ed. May 4, 1983) (statement of Attorney General, Mr. Peter D. Sutherland, S.C., quoted from The Irish Times, Feb. 16, 1983).
149. Exodus 20:13 (King James).
REFERENDUM"-THE
CASE
150. O'Mahony, A Catholic View, in "THE ABORTION
AGAINST
35, 38 (M.Arnold & P. Kirby eds. 1983).
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stay alive, but only one was available, the doctor could not utilize the system for either patient since it would interfere with the
equal right to life of the other.
In addition, the amendment merely states that the equal
rights of the mother and the unborn will be defended and vindicated by Irish laws only "as far as practicable." The Irish translation, recognized by the constitution as the prevailing language
in cases of conflict,161reads: "sa mheid gur feidir e," which literally translated means "as far as possible." This phrase also appears as part of the article of the constitution into which the
~~
amendment was i n c ~ r p o r a t e d . ' Under
either translation, the
language makes allowance for situations that may arise where it
is not "practicable" or even "possible" to protect the right to life
of the unborn.
The equal rights provision of the Irish Constitution, included in the same article as the prolife amendment, also recognizes this. It states: "All citizens shall, as human persons, be
held equal before the law. This shall not be held to mean that
the State shall not in its enactments have due regard to differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social function."153
In 1972, in O'Brien v. Keogh,154the Irish Supreme Court suggested that "equal" may not mean a mathematical equality.
Chief Justice OyDalaighstated that, "Article 40 does not require
identical treatment of all persons without recognition of differences in relevant circumstances. It only forbids invidious
discriminati~n."'~~
Justice Walsh previously commented in State v. An Bord
Uchtala:166
In the opinion of the Court section 1 of Article 40 is not to be
read as a guarantee or undertaking that all citizens shall be
treated by the law as equal for all purposes, but rather as an
acknowledgment of the human equality of all citizens and that
such equality will be recognised in the laws of the State. The
section itself in its provision, "this shall not be held to mean
that the State shall not in its enactments have due regard to
151. IRISHCONST.art. 25.4.6. This article provides: "In case of conflict between the
texts of a law enrolled under this section in both the official languages, the text in the
national language shall prevail."
152. Id. art. 40.3.1.
153. Id. art. 40.1.
154. 1972 Ir. R. 144.
155. Id. at 156.
156. 1966 Ir. R. 567.
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differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social function," is a recognition that inequality may or must result from
some special abilities or from some deficiency or from some
special need and it is clear that the Article does not either envisage or guarantee equal measure in all things to all citizens.
To do so regardless of the factors mentioned would be
ineq~ality.'~~
More realistically, the weakness of the constitutional right
to life for the unborn is that the unborn, by its nature, cannot
assert that right. Therefore, this right must be capable of being
asserted by a third party. Those opposed to the amendment
feared that individuals concerned about the rights of the unborn, might be able to obtain injunctions to prevent Irish women
from going abroad to have abortions. Technically this appears
possible. The Irish Supreme Court stated in Cahill u. S u t t ~ n , ' ~ ~
that, while the general rule of standing is that "the challenger
must adduce circumstances showing that the impugned provision is operating, or is poised to operate, in such a way as to
deprive him personally of the benefit of a particular constitutional right,"159 third parties, in "exceptional cases, hopefully
rare," may also be heard on behalf of persons who cannot assert
their own rights.leOThe pertinent question is the likelihood that
third parties will stalk women they suspect may go abroad to
have an abortion. In all probability, it can be expected that such
injunctive actions, if they are permitted by the Irish courts,
would generally be brought by the father. If such a situation
were to arise, the judiciary would have to resolve the matter
with due regard for the rights of all parties.
Lastly, Ireland is a signator of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.lel Therefore, the
validity of the Irish constitutional amendment may be challenged in the European courts. The European Commission,
charged with ensuring compliance with the provisions of the
Convention, could find Ireland in violation of one of the articles
of the convention. However, this is unlikely in view of previous
abortion decisions by the Commission, which demonstrate its reluctance to interfere with abortion legislation in individual
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 639.
1980 Ir. R. 269.
Id. at 282.
Id. at 277.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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member countries.ls2 Even if the amendment was determined to
162. The first abortion case before the Commission was brought in the 1960s by a
Norwegian man challenging a Norwegian abortion law as violative of the rights of the
unborn. He claimed the unborn was protected under the language of article two of the
Convention which provided, "Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law." The
Commission found the petition was inadmissible on the grounds that "only a victim of
an alleged violation of the convention may bring an application" and that the Norwegian
petitioner, who declared that he acted in the interest of third persons, "could not claim
to be himself the victim of a violation of the Convention." Gorby, The West German
Abortion Decision before the European Commission on Human Rights, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN
ABORTION
264 (1981) (quoting Application No. 86760, Collection of
Decisions 6, a t 34).
The first abortion case actually decided by the Commission was Bruggerinann &
Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, 1978 Y.B. EUR.CONV.ON HUMAN
RIGHTS638
(Eur. Comm'n on Human Rights). Two West German women claimed that (1) a decision
of the West German Constitutional Court that invalidated part of a 1974 abortion law
permitting abortions in the first trimester with approval of a doctor and the mother, and
(2) a subsequent law that prohibited abortion a t any time absent exceptional circumstances, violated Article 8(1) and other Articles of the Convention. Article 8(1) provides,
"[Elverybody has the right to respect for his private or family life, his home and his
correspondence." The Commission held that neither the German abortion legislation nor
the Federal Constitutional Court's decision violated any Convention right.
This decision has raised questions about whether the Commission will interfere with
the abortion laws of individual member States. One commentator suggested that in view
of the wide divergence of abortion laws among member nations "a decision in Bruggemann and Scheuten's favor would have had the effect of declaring the law on abortion
in most of the member States incompatible with the European Convention on Human
Rights-a decision which would hardly inspire confidence in the Commission on Human
Rights. Gorby, supra, a t 274. He postulated that the decision "reflects the caution of a n
international legal body whose powers of enforcement are minimal." Id.
The most recent case to come before the Commission, Paton v. United Kingdom, 3
EUR.HUM.RTS. REP 408 (1980). seems to provide support for this theory. Paton applied
to the English courts for a n injunction to prevent his wife from getting a n abortion. The
English courts refused to grant the injunction, holding that the father had no right to
stop the mother from having an abortion, even if he was her husband. Id. a t 410. Paton
appealed the decision to the Commission, which concluded:
The Commission . . . does not find that the husband's and potential father's
right to respect for his private and family life can be interpreted so widely as
to embrace such procedural rights as claimed by the applicant, i.e. a right to be
consulted, or a right to make applications, about a n abortion which his wife
intends to have performed on her.
Id. a t 417. Before deciding that the application was inadmissible, the Commission considered whether article two, while not providing any express limitation concerning the
fetus, is to be interpreted (1) as not covering the fetus a t all, (2) as recognizing a right to
life with certain limitations, or (3) as recognizing a n absolute right to life. Id. a t 415. The
Commission readily dismissed the idea that the fetus had an absolute right to life, noting
that almost all signators a t the time of the signing of the Convention permitted some
form of abortion legislation. Id. However, the Commission circumvented the more difficult questions by concluding:
T h e Commission considers that i t is not in these circumstances called upon to
decide whether Article 2 does not cover the foetus a t all or whether it
recognises a "right to life" of the foetus with implied limitations. I t finds that
the authorisation, by the United Kingdom authorities, of the abortion com-
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violate the Convention, the Commission has no power to order
changes in the domestic laws of Ireland; Ireland has previously
ignored decisions of the Commission without any detrimental
con~equences.~~~

The Irish prolife amendment grew out of fears that the
nearly universal trend to liberalize abortion legislation might
plained of is compatible with Article 2(1), first sentence because, if one assumes that this provision applies a t the initial stage of the pregnancy, the
abortion is covered by an implied limitation, protecting the life and health of
the woman a t that stage, of the "right to life" of the foetus.
Id. a t 416.
163. The Commission is not a traditional court of appeal. It may find that a particular piece of legislation violates one of the articles of the Convention, but it has no power
to overrule any domestic law of a member state. Telephone interview with Professor
John Gorby (Nov. 8, 1984). Admittedly, article 53 does provide, "The High Contracting
Parties undertake to abide by the decision of the Court in any case to which they are
parties." This means that, while the Convention, as a treaty, is binding on all states that
have ratified it, the Commission's decisions are still not enforceable until the Convention
has been adopted into the domestic law of the state. Ireland has not done this.
The Irish Constitution provides, "No international agreement shall be part of the
domestic law of the State save as may be determined by the Oireachtas." IRISHCONST.
art. 29.6. I t further states, "The sole and exclusive power of making laws for the State is
hereby vested in the Oireachtas: no other legislative authority has power to make laws
for the State." Id. art. 15.2.1. In 1960, the Irish Supreme Court indicated its refusal to
apply the provisions of the Convention in In re O'Laighleis, 1960 Ir. R. 93. The Court
stated:
The Oireachtas has not determined that the Convention of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms is to be part of the domestic law of the State, and
accordingly this Court cannot give effect to the Convention if it be contrary to
domestic law or purports to grant rights or impose obligations additional to
those of domestic law.
Id. a t 125. The situation remains the same today. One commentator recently concluded,
"Nearly thirty years after ratifying the European Convention on Human Rights, Ireland
has still failed to incorporate it into domestic law. As a consequence the Irish Courts
have, for the most part, refused to take cognisance of the provisions of the Convention in
domestic cases." Comment, The Application of the European Convention on Human
Rights before the Irish Courts, 31 INT'L& COMP.L.Q. 856, 860-61 (1982).
No action has been taken against Ireland for failing to incorporate the Convention
into domestic law. It is possible that Ireland could be asked to withdraw or even be
expelled from the Commission if it were determined that Irish abortion laws violated one
of the articles of the Convention, and Ireland refused to modify its stance on abortion.
However, this is highly unlikely in view of what appears to be a clear reluctance on the
part of the Commission to interfere with abortion legislation in member countries. In the
35 year existence of the Commission only one country, Greece, has been asked to withdraw. and that was for flagrant violations of numerous articles. For a discussion of the
relationship between the Convention and the domestic law of the signatories generally,
and Ireland specifically, see Buergenthal, The Domestic Status of the European ConvenL. REV.354 (1964).
tion on Human Rights, 13 BUFFALO

-

402

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I984

eventually reach Ireland. The amendment attempts to constitutionally establish the ultimate balance between the mother's
rights and the unborn's right to life. Viewed against the longstanding Irish legislative, judicial, and public policy of protecting the life of the unborn, it appears that the real motivation for
the amendment was not that the prior law did not adequately
prevent abortion. Rather, the amendment stemmed from a political and social fear that a clear and dramatic rejection of abortion was necessary to prevent the country from drifting into a
slow acceptance of abortion over time, as has happened in most
other western nations. Once the amendment had been proposed,
it was also critical that it or some equally strong anti-abortion
amendment be passed, because a defeat could have been interpreted as a signal that Ireland was ready for some form of abortion legislati~n.'~~
Interestingly enough, the broad language of the amendment
may permit rather than prevent the introduction of abortion legislation in Ireland. However, in spite of the potential problems,
passage of the amendment by such a large margin can be expected to lend a powerful endorsement to the existing prohibition of abortion in Ireland.ls6

John A. Quinlan

164. This is consistent with a statement made by the Women's Right to Choose
Group (a separate organization from the Women's Right to Choose Campaign) that concluded, "[Tlhe current political objective is the defeat of the amendment, the pro-abortion lobby comes later." Address by Professor Cornelius O'Leary, Vice-chairman of the
Pro-Life Amendment Campaign (Aug. 16, 1983) (quoting sunday Tribune, May 15,
1983).
165. The Women's Right to Choose Campaign has even accepted this conclusion.
They recently stated:
By winning the referendum PLAC [Pro-Life Amendment Campaign] have
[sic] indeed made it impossible for abortion to become legal without another
referendum on the issue. That does make our long-term task more difficult-but only marginally so, because there had been no prospect of achieving
any liberalisation of the law in the foreseeable future anyway.

....

Apart from the Post-Referendum Solidarity March in July 1984 which
highlighted SPUC's [Society for the Protection of Unborn Children] pickets on
Open Line [an abortion referral agency in Dublin] and a right to choose
counter-picket a t SPUC's referendum anniversary vigil on September 7th this
year, next to nothing was heard publicly of a pro-abortion nature in 1984. To
some extent this may be due to sheer weariness, but it also suggests a certain
level of dismay among right to choose supporters.
Fighting for Control-the Ongoing Struggle for Reproductive Rights, in THEIRISHFEMINIST REVIEW
7, 23-24 (Women's Community Press 1984)."

